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FARMERS, RANCHERS, AND THE RAILROAD
THE EVOLUTION OF FENCE LAW IN THE GREAT PLAINS,

1865~1900

YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA

In

North America, building fences was an
essential part of life for the English settlers from
the beginning. Departing from the English
common law rule that required owners to fence
in their cattle, nearly all the colonial legislatures and courts imposed upon landowners a
duty to fence their property against trespassing
cattle. l The reasons were partly to increase
the meager supply of livestock by permitting
cattle to wander about in order to breed faster
and partly to make full use of the vast virgin
forest and grassland. Gradually, however, in
New England and in much of New York and
New Jersey, where township settlement and

mixed husbandry prevailed, this practice was
replaced by the system of common pasturage.
During the crop growing season, common pasture was set off and fenced, and herdsmen were
employed by the towns to supervise grazing, but
after harvest animals were allowed to roam at
large until spring planting. 2
In the southern colonies, where settlements
were made by individuals without group cooperation, the landowners' liability was more strictly
observed. Quite different from the New England
practice, all the southern colonies prohibited
the fencing of any land except the fields under
actual cultivation. Thus nonlandholders commonly grazed their cattle and hogs on others'
land. As late as the 1830s, Virginia planters were
still trying to obtain legislation to permit the
fencing of their whole estates or at least their
pastures. The prohibition on fencing continued
to prevail on each moving frontier, while in the
older regions the open range gave way to the
common law rule as they were more settled. 3
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FENCING IN THE GREAT PLAINS

The Great Plains underwent a similar
experience. One after another, the Plains
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FIG. 1. The Great Plains Environment. Reproduced from The Great Plains by Walter Prescott Webb (1931;
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981).

states confirmed the rule of fencing that came
to characterize all earlier American frontiers, requiring farmers to fence out domestic
animals, which were allowed to run at large
without liability. Yet the unique natural influence and social environment in the Great
Plains did modify the traditional pattern of
the open range in the East. The fencing conflicts between farmers and cattlemen in the
Great Plains, as Walter Prescott Webb points
out, greatly intensified and changed what had
been a predominantly individual quarrel into
an antagonistic confrontation. 4 Gradually,
however, as farmers came to predominate, they
compelled the adoption of herd laws, freeing
them of the obligation to fence and imposing
liability on the owners of animals. Although
the pace of the process differed from place to

place, the animal liability laws in the Plains
reverted to the principles established in English
common law.
This article is divided into three parts.
The first examines specific fencing policies
in Kansas, Nebraska, and other Plains states,
highlighting the transformation from the
"fence-out" to "fence-in" (herd laws) policies.
The second part discusses the coming of the
railroads to the Great Plains and the farmers
and the ranchers as beneficiaries who soon
became victims. And finally, the third section analyzes railroad fence laws passed in
Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma, the litigation over loss of livestock, and the unfavorable
position the state courts generally took toward
the railroads, based upon the dual nature of the
railroad fence law.

THE EVOLUTION OF FENCE LAW IN THE GREAT PLAINS
FENCING POLICIES

As early as 1855, Kansas's first territorial
legislature enacted a law imposing a duty upon
landowners to fence "all fields and inclosure,"
specifying how a lawful fence must be constructed. "If any horse, cattle or other stock
shall break into any inclosure" protected by
a legal fence, the owner of the livestock was
to pay the injured party full compensation.
Unless his land was enclosed by a lawful fence,
the landowner could not recover. This law certainly reflected the situation in the mid-nineteenth-century Great Plains, an "open range"
country; the wide prairies could be made most
productive by cattle grazing, and it was absurd
to impose upon stock owners the common law
duty of keeping their animals confined to their
own land. s Fencing in the Great Plains, where
timber was short, was a challenge for the settlers. They started with zigzag rail fence, but
as they quickly exhausted timber, they turned
to hedges, especially of Osage orange, which
came to be extensively used in the eastern part
of Kansas and Nebraska. As the fence law came
gradually to be counterbalanced by herd laws,
farmers made few enclosures before barbed wire
became widely used. 6
In 1868 Kansas farmers were able to secure
the "night herd law," which gave the electors of
each township the power to decide whether the
owners should "fence in" their stock during the
night. Two years later, another law passed providing for a regular (both night and day) herd
law but limiting it to only five counties. It was
declared unconstitutional in the case of Darling
v. Rodgers (1871) because it operated in only a
limited area, contrary to the equal treatment of
counties guaranteed by the state constitution.
The legislature accordingly passed another law
in 1872 authorizing the county commissioners
to decide on the adoption of the herd law, and
by the end of the year, twenty-six counties out
of the seventy-two adopted the herd law.? It
was not until 1889 that the general herd law
passed, making it applicable to all the counties and requiring all animals to be fenced in.
This statute became the basis for the Herd Law
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of 1929, which was applicable to all livestock
throughout the state. 8
Many other Plains states-Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, Texas, and Wyoming, as well as
Idaho and Nevada-followed suit? The implementation of herd laws was usually the result of
a long struggle of farmers, who favored the strict
liability principle of the common law, against
stock raisers, who held on to the "open range"
policy embodied in the fence law.lO Only Utah,
Dakota, and Oklahoma opted for the fence-in
policy in their early stages of development. ll By
the time Oklahoma adopted its first fence law
in 1890, the practice of allowing stock to roam
freely was rapidly disappearing from the Great
Plains. The Oklahoma statute provided that
every owner of swine, sheep, goats, stallions,
jacks, and all other stock should restrain his
animals from running at large "at all seasons of
the year." The county commissioners, however,
on a petition signed by twenty-five resident
freeholders, could divide their counties into
districts and select some districts for stock to
run at large, except for swine, sheep, goats, stallions, and jacks. The decision should be made
based upon the condition of the land, whether
watered, timbered, or prairie, its streams, and
whether the land was best adapted to agriculture or srock raising.
COMING OF THE RAILROADS

The coming of the railroads to the Plains
complicated the struggle between farmers and
ranchers that had been taking place during the
1870s and 1880s. Now they had to take on their
common enemy, the railroads, which became
the center of controversy because the railroads
not only killed so many animals but also caused
indirectly the devastation of their fields.!2
The first transcontinental railroad, constructed by the Union Pacific and the Central
Pacific, completed in May 1869, stimulated
the construction of other transcontinental
lines and a network of feeder lines: the Kansas
Pacific; the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe;
the Southern Pacific; the Northern Pacific;
the Great Northern; the Missouri Pacific; the
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FIG. 3. Early transcontinental railroad lines, 1887. From "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History
of the American West by Richard White. Copyright © 1991 by the University of Oklahoma Press, Norman.
Reprinted by permission of the publisher. All Rights Reserved.

Railway Company alone killed 1,948 animals
in the three states where it operated, costing
about $25,000. The Texas and Pacific for 1877-78
reported that it cost $65.84 per mile to operate
the line in order to cover the loss of livestock.
The Denver and Rio Grande Railroad killed
at least $25,000 worth of livestock during the
winter of 1884. The losses were estimated to be
even larger along the Union Pacific line.18
The problem was that the animals became
attracted to the railroad right of way, where
they could find greener grass, shelter from
winds, and higher, drier ground. Moreover, the
railroads not only had to pass through a wider
range of land in the Great Plains but also had

to confront the greater herds of livestock roaming the range. 19 Although both passenger and
freight trains were "in perpetual danger from
cattle straying" on the tracks, the railroads
were reluctant to assume the high cost of
enclosing their extensive rights of way.
ENACTMENT OF RAILROAD FENCE LAWS

The Plains state legislatures heatedly
debated the problem of assigning responsibility
and liability for the loss of animals and injury
to train passengers. Could the cattlemen along
the railroads' rights of way be required to
enclose their stock, should the railway compa-
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though numerous, involved losses of small
numbers of domestic animals, without causing
much damage to the trains and serious loss of
property and life among the passengers.29
Suits were usually instituted by the animal
owners at the justice of the peace, who routinely awarded the plaintiffs damages, and then
the cases were appealed by the railroads to the
county courts, where they were tried by jury.
After favorable judgments for the plaintiffs, the
railroads appealed to the state supreme court.
Not only were the lawsuits a lengthy process,
taking about two years, but the reversal rate
was also very high. In Kansas, for example, the
Supreme Court heard fifty-four appeals during
the period from 1869 to 1914, all but two of
which were appealed by the defendant railroad
companies. In twenty out of the fifty-two cases,
the highest court reversed the decisions in
favor of the appellant railroads (39%).30
This litigation was also expensive, often
costing more than the value of the property
destroyed. The Kansas Act of 1874 authorized
the allowance of an attorney's fee when judgment was rendered for the plaintiff,3l and the
court began awarding attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs: $15 on $35 damages, $33 on
$90 damages, $30 on $30 for a heifer killed. In
1876, when the plaintiff asked for a $25 attorney's fee on the award of $39 for the value of
a steer and a heifer killed, the Kansas Pacific's
counsel protested. The court, however, found
the plaintiff's request reasonable, because if
he was compelled to pay his own attorney's
fees, the amount of his claim (uniformly small)
would be consumed by attorney's fees, leaving
the plaintiff in no better position than before. 32
In an 1878 case, however, the Kansas Supreme
Court denied a thirty-dollar attorney's fee,
although the plaintiff was awarded two hundred dollars for the damage done to two mares,
on the grounds that the railroad was found only
partially liable. Such fees were allowed, the
court reasoned, only in an action in which the
company had full liability under the statute. 33
One form of protest the railroads used
against the fencing obligation was to challenge
the railroad-fence legislation on constitutional

grounds. Two years after its passage, the Kansas
Act of 1874 was challenged by Kansas Pacific,
which had been ordered to pay thirty-nine
dollars for killing a steer and a heifer. The
railroad's lawyers insisted that the company's
liability under this act could not be derived
from the common law, but the court declared
the act constitutional because the power to
impose such liability came from the police
power of the state. 34
In 1890, when the Missouri Pacific was sued
under a new Kansas law, "An Act to Compel
Railroad Companies to Fence Their Roads by
and through Lands Enclosed with a Lawful
Fence," for reimbursement of the expense the
landowner incurred to fence the railroad side
of his land, it challenged the constitutionality
of the law, which was based upon the law of
1874. The Kansas Supreme Court, however,
rejected the Missouri Pacific's assertion and
declared the law constitutional and valid,
insisting that it was in accordance with the
decision of Kansas Pacific Railway Company
v. Mower (1876), which had been upheld and
approved. 35
Although they could not successfully challenge the basic premises of the railroad fence
laws, the railroad companies were able to
convince the courts to declare laws unconstitutional on peripheral matters. Two cases, coming
from two of the Great Basin states, which
Webb included in the Great Plains environment, dealt with such issues. In 1885 Northern
Pacific challenged the validity of Montana's
1881 "Act to Provide for the Payment of Stock
Killed or Injured by Railroads" and argued that
the clause "the findings of such appraisers shall
be taken and held to be conclusive evidence
of the value and ownership of and the injury
to such stock" prevented the company from
exercising its rights of appeal from the finding
of the appraisers, thus depriving it of the right
of trial by jury. The court ruled for the railroad,
holding that such a provision was in fact in
conflict with the U.S. Constitution. 36
Four years later, the Union Pacific was also
successful in challenging the validity of the
Idaho railroad fence law of 1878. The company
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protested that the law was unconstitutional
because it made the killing of an animal by
legitimate railroad companies, which were running trains legally and for great public benefit,
the only test of its liability, nor did any general
Idaho statute require railroad companies to
fence their tracks. The court agreed and ruled
that the law, by making the killing of an animal
by the railroad the sole liability test, deprived
it of the "due process of law" guaranteed by the
u.s. Constitution. 37
The railroads not only challenged the validity of the laws but also tried to interpret them
strictly, especially the extent of injury, in order
to evade their liability. In 1878 the Atchison,
Topeka, and Santa Fe railroad was sued for
fatally injuring a mare that got onto the track
at a site where it was not fenced. Frightened by
an approaching train, she fled and reached a tie
bridge, where her leg fell between the ties, causing injury. The railroad insisted that the injury
had not been caused "by the engine or cars ...
in operating such railway," as required by the
act of 1874. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled,
however, that the liability was not limited to
cases of "actual collision" but extended to those
cases where the animal was injured "in any
other manner."38 The same court subsequently
decided several cases similarly.
Damage to livestock after it escaped from
the right of way was not usually a natural consequence of the railroad's failure to construct
and maintain proper fences. The railroad
appellants won several cases in which the
railroads had originally been held liable for
such damages,39 but they were nevertheless
usually unsuccessful in preventing the Kansas
Supreme Court from broadening the scope of
their liability for the injury of stock. They were
even held liable for "the stock that wandered
away from the right of way and became lost"
and for "a horse which, while on its right of way
became frightened, and was killed by running
into a fence not on the right of way."40
In Texas, the railroads were more successful in convincing the court to strictly limit
the scope of the injury defined by the railroad
fence law. In 1887 the International and Great
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Northern Railroad Company, when sued for an
injury an animal incurred upon the trestle, onto
which the animal had run frightened by the
train, argued that there was no contact between
the animal and the train. The Texas Supreme
Court, to which the case was appealed, agreed
and reversed the judgment below in favor of the
railroad, stating that in no case could a recovery
be had for an injury to animals where there
was no collision with a moving engine or car.
In some cases, the court did recognize that the
injury, without collision, might be the proximate result of the railroad's negligence, but the
recovery in such cases would not be based upon
the railroad fence law of 1879.41
The railroads also tried to disclaim their
liability to their own employees in accidents
resulting from their failure to fence the rights
of way. In 1896, for example, James Quill,
a locomotive engineer of the Houston and
Texas Central Railway Company, was killed
by the derailment of his engine as the result of
a collision with cattle that had entered upon
the track through the company's negligence
to keep its fence in repair. In a suit instituted by his wife and daughter, the railroad
company not only insisted that Quill knew
that the fence was defective and cattle were
getting within the enclosure but presented
evidence that Quill had previously struck
cattle and horses with his locomotive at eight
different times during a fifteen-month period
and was reprimanded for killing so many
stock. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that
Quill had assumed the risk, but the plaintiffs
could recover if the deceased did not know of
the defective fence. 42
Railroads could also disclaim their liability when accidents occurred in public places,
where the railroads were not required to fence
their rights of way. Although the railroad
fence statutes seldom specified liability in such
areas,43 the courts in construing the statutes
interpolated certain exceptions and held that
the statute was inapplicable whenever superior
obligation forbade a fence.
Where a railroad was laid along a public
street in a city, town, or village, the company
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was not required or permitted to fence its track,
nor was it required to fence its track at its
switch limits within a municipality or to fence
across legally laid out highways crossing its
tracks. Thus a railroad was not liable for injuring cattle at night in the switch area. 44
The railroads tried to disclaim their liability
by broadly defining the areas in which they
were immune from building fences. The courts
in Kansas and many other Plains states, however, continually ruled that the railroad could
not evade its liability for not fencing even
within the limits of a municipality, if such
fences would not obstruct the streets, highways,
or public guards. 45
The Texas Supreme Court, in the case
of International and Great Northern Railway
Company v. Cocke (1885), clarified the company's liability at public crossings for damage
to stock, stating that the situation was the
same as if the road were fenced. If, therefore,
stock were lawfully running at large, the
company was liable for injury to stock only
when it failed to exercise ordinary care. If,
on the other hand, animals were running
at large illegally, the company would not be
responsible for injury, unless the company
was grossly negligent. 46 The same court two
years later specifically enumerated the places
that public necessity or convenience required
should be left unfenced, such as the streets of
a city or town, the depot, and station. 47
Perhaps the most important weapon the
railroads used to defend their cases was the
herd law. They constantly cited it in their
attempts to prove contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiffs, which in turn
could release the companies from their
liability. Especially in Kansas, the issue was
a hard-fought battle for the railroads. In one
of the earliest cases, Central Branch Railroad
Company v. Lea (1878), in which the plaintiff
sued the railroad for killing one of her cows by
its moving train, the Supreme Court accepted
the railroad's assertion of contributory negligence of the plaintiff and found fault on both
sides. The railroad, in violation of the law of
1874, failed to fence its track where the cow

was killed, but the owner did permit her cow
to run at large at night in a county where both
the night herd law of 1868 and the general
herd law of 1872 were in force. The court held
that the owner, in disregarding the statute,
was equally at fault with the railroad company, and therefore could not recover. 48
On the other hand, the court maintained
that the stock owner could collect damages if
the owner obeyed the herd law but the railroad
did not obey the fence law. Thus the owner of
hogs that he kept and pastured on his land in a
herd-law county could recover for a hog killed
upon the railroad track, where it had strayed.
Similarly, a farmer living in a county where the
herd law was in force could recover for the loss
of his hogs, which escaped, through no fault
of his own, by breaking through his enclosure,
regardless of whether or not the railroad had
fenced the track, although a legal fence would
not have prevented hogs from getting into the
right of way.49
By 1891 the emphasis had shifted. In the
previously cited lawsuit brought by a sheep
owner against Missouri Pacific for killing
twelve sheep and injuring seventeen more,
the railroad fence law became the key issue.
The pasture was enclosed with a sheep-tight
barbed-wire fence, but the railroad track that
ran through the enclosure was not fenced.
The railroad in its defense concentrated on
the question of why the sheep strayed onto its
right of way. The Supreme Court, however,
maintained that if the railroad had enclosed
its track with a lawful fence, it would not have
been liable, even though the fence would not
have kept the sheep off the track. Since it did
not, the company was declared liable. 50
The pendulum shifted again by 1905, when
the Missouri Pacific was once more sued, for
killing three mules and a colt. The defendant tried to find fault with the owner of the
animals, but the court found that the stock
killed were the ordinary farm stock kept in
the owner's pasture enclosed with an ordinary
fence in a county where the herd law was in
force. Since the stock escaped without the
owner's being at fault, the court held that the
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owner of the stock could recover, regardless of
the position of the railroad in the fence law of
1874. 51 Throughout the period the problem for
the Kansas Supreme Court was a balancing act,
deciding which law, the railroad fence law or
the herd law, should be used to ascertain the
extent of negligence for the injury or killing of
stock on railroad tracks.
In Texas, the railroads concentrated their
efforts on proving contributory negligence in
the plaintiff's conduct. They based their arguments on the 1876 act "Preventing Certain
Animals from Running at Large in Counties
and Subdivisions," which authorized the
county to restrict certain animals from running at large. 52 The Texas courts had taken a
position favorable to the railroads, fully considering the stock (herd) law to determine the
liability of the railroad. Thus, where the stock
law was in force, prohibiting stock from running at large, the degree of care that a railroad
company was required to exercise in preventing
injuries was much less than where there was no
such law. 53
In Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railway
Company of Texas v. Tolbert (1907), an action
to recover the value of a mule killed by the
defendant's locomotives, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$175. The Texas Supreme Court, to which the
railroad appealed, rejected the appellant's contention that the stock law was legally in force
in the county, because the court found the
stock law petition defective. The court ruled,
accordingly, that the railroad fence law (article
5428) alone would control the case; without a
stock law or with a defective stock law, there
was nothing to modify the plaintiff's right of
recovery.54
The railroads suffered a major defeat in
Nebraska, where the Supreme Court took a
more clear-cut, hostile position. The court
construed the statute of 1867, which made a
railroad company liable for stock killed upon
its track, in such a way that a railroad company
was not relieved of liability even though the
stock killed was running at large in violation
of law.
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DUAL OBJECTIVES OF THE RAILROAD
FENCE LAW

In Burlington and Missouri River Railway
Company v. Brinckman (1883), the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the railroad was
liable for stock killed upon its track while
running at large at night, although the 1877
statute prohibited stock from running at large
at night. The duty of the railroad to erect
and maintain fences, the court explained,
was for the public benefit and security as well
as for the benefit of the cattle owners, and
therefore the court considered the matter too
important to leave to the thousand proprietors along the road. Nor were damages done
to the cattle limited to those of the adjoining
owners. The court further pointed out that
the statute required all railroad companies to
fence their tracks and to put in cattle guards
at road crossings. If the railroad failed to do
so, they should absolutely be liable to the
owners of the stock killed or injured, and the
question of negligence of the owner would
not enter into the case. 55
Two years later, in Chicago Burlington and
Quincy Railway Company v. Sims (1885), the
Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the contention of the defendant railroad that the
owner willfully and purposely had turned his
animal loose to run at large and that evidence
was not sufficient to prove that the accident
had occurred because of the lack of fencing.
Strictly following its Brinckman decision, the
court made the railroad liable for the stock
killed upon its track. 56
In Oklahoma, a fence-in country, no stock
was allowed to run at large. Where a railroad
was not required to fence its right of way but
did so voluntarily, the railroad was not liable
unless it was negligent by failing to keep
the fence in good condition and as a result,
trespassing cattle were killed. 57 The railroad
lost an important battle in 1912, however,
when the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld
Nebraska's Brinckman ruling, stating that the
herd law did not alter the railroad's obligation
to fence the rights of way. 58 The railroad's
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refusal to construct a hog-proof fence bordering its right of way, despite the hog owner's
request, was sufficient to make the company
liable.
CONCLUSION

By the end of the nineteenth century, the
herd law had become a standard rule, marking the end of the frontier in the Great Plains.
By then not only were many western railroads
forced to fence their rights of way, at least partially, but also more stock owners voluntarily
enclosed their lands as the cost of barbed-wire
fencing became affordable.
Consequently, lawsuits involving railroad
fences dwindled to an insignificant number.
It is difficult to speculate which was more
economical for the railroads, to avoid their
liability by fencing both sides of entire lines or
by fighting lawsuits in court and successfully
defending their cases. The railroads considered
the fencing requirement a costly and unfair
burden arbitrarily imposed on them. The legal
forum the railroads chose to use, as defendants
seeking solutions, was largely a disappointment. The law of railroad fencing, as the courts
interpreted it, was never intended as, nor ever
became, a vehicle to promote the interest of the
railroad enterprise but came to serve mainly
the interest of the stock owners along the track
as well as to protect the passengers and their
property. The vigorous defense the railroads
put up, trying to safeguard their economic
interest, however, did lead to an unexpected,
important transformation of railroad fence law
into a mature body of law.
Nevertheless, by the beginning of the twentieth century the railroad fence law had fully
developed into the railroad stock law, which
came to impose liability on railroads "without
regard to negligence" for the wounding or killing of animals by a train. The requirement
that railroads fence their rights of way in
order to avoid civil liability for the destruction
of livestock by passing trains did drastically
broaden railroad liability. This enlarged burden
certainly might have been one of the state

regulations imposed on the railroads, such as
freight rates during the Gilded Age, that some
historians have claimed were major factors in
the eventual decline of American railroads.
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History of Agriculture in the Southern United States
to 1860 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution
of Washington, 1933), 1:138-51, 2:843, argues that
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Nebraska Press, 1981) provides an excellent account
of how open-range cattle raising moved steadily from
seventeenth-century Carolina to the Texas of the
1870s. On the other hand, Forrest McDonald and
Grady McWhiney maintain that the open range was
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